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paper introduces a model of coordination failure to analyze how a rela-
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11 Introduction
After the collapse of the asset price bubble in Japan, banks have been reluctant to
write off non-performing loans, even when there was little prospect of debtor firms
being able to repay the loans extended. Instead, the banks often engaged in refi-
nancing of economically insolvent debtors, gambling that somehow these firms will
recover. A number of studies provide empirical evidence for this phenomenon known
as forbearance lending. By estimating the loan supply and demand in major Japanese
industries, Sekine et al. [2003] find that outstanding loans are apt to increase
to firms whose debt-asset ratio exceeds a certain level. Peek and Rosengren
[2005] argue that Japanese banks engage in forbearance lending to massage their
balance sheets and examine how this behavior impairs economic efficiency. They
show that debtor firms are far more likely to be refinanced if they are in poor finan-
cial condition, even though these firms continue to perform poorly after receiving
additional bank financing. In reference to this misallocation of credit, Caballero
et al. [2005] introduce and test a model suggesting that forbearance lending dis-
torts competition throughout the rest of the economy by keeping unprofitable firms
in business.
Another issue, referred to as the soft budget constraint problem, can arise from for-
bearance lending if banks are unable to commit credibly not to refinance a debtor in
financial distress. Kornai [1980] originally coined the term soft budget constraints
to illustrate economic behavior in socialist economies, in which the government is
disposed to bail out loss-making firms and thus undermines ex ante incentives of
these firms.1 According to Kornai’s definition we say that a debtor firm has a soft
budget constraint if it can expect to receive additional credit from a bank and if
those expectations diminish the firm’s incentives to work against default. Evolving
from Schaffer [1989], Dewatripont and Maskin [1995] as well as Berglo¨f
and Roland [1997, 1998] introduced models formalizing the dynamic commit-
ment problem of a bank which gives rise to soft budget constraints. They show that
it is an ex post rational choice for a bank to refinance firms with ex ante unprofitable
projects if the sunk costs of the prior investment are sufficiently high. This leads
to perverse incentives for the debtor firms, as they anticipate the bank’s policy of
forbearance.
However, neither of these previous models on forbearance lending and soft bud-
get constraints regards the fact that firms typically hold credit relations to diverse
1 SeeMaskin [1996] andKornai et al. [2003] for an elaborate theoretical survey on soft budget
constraints.
2banking institutions and that coordination failure among these banks can induce
inefficient credit terminations.2 Complementing the work of Morris and Shin
[2005] and Takeda and Takeda [2005], we attempt to fill this gap by developing
a model of coordination failure among multiple heterogeneous creditors. Assuming
that a firm is financed by a single relationship bank and a continuum of arm’s length
banks, this paper analyzes under which conditions the relationship bank is disposed
to refinance an otherwise insolvent firm and in what circumstances such forbearance
lending leads to soft budget constraints for the debtor firm. In order to determine
the incidence of coordination failure among the banks’ credit decisions, we build on
the theory of global games as introduced by Carlsson and van Damme [1993]
and generalized byMorris and Shin [2003] and Frankel et al. [2003].3 Based
on the assumption that players receive noisy private signals regarding an underly-
ing fundamental state, global games produce a unique equilibrium in coordination
games that typically have multiple equilibria under complete information.
Morris and Shin [2005] adopt the equilibrium selection framework of global
games to analyze soft budget constraints in a situation where official liquidity pro-
vision by the IMF could prevent an international financial crises. In a similar game
theoretic context Takeda and Takeda [2005] examine the effects of refinancing
provided by a self-interested large creditor on the behavior of small creditors and
a debtor firm. However, their model ascribes a rather passive role to the the large
creditor. His influence on the firm’s fate is limited to the effect that he can merely
choose whether and how much to refinance. Small creditors are able to observe the
large lender’s behavior, but cannot avail this additional information to learn more
about the financial state of the firm.
This paper models the relationship bank as a large strategic player, extending the
approach of Takeda and Takeda [2005] on two counts. Similar to Berglo¨f
and Roland [1997], we consider the outside option for the relationship bank to
invest in new lending. If the debtor firm is in hopeless financial condition even with
refinancing, the relationship bank can withdraw its credit and seize the collateral of
the firm. Our second contribution is to incorporate social learning in the model. The
arm’s length banks are able to update their beliefs regarding the financial state of
the firm by taking into consideration the relationship bank’s roll over or foreclosure
decision. Hence, the relationship bank can affect the fate of the debtor firm not
2 For empirical evidence on the prevalence of multiple heterogeneous bank lending see Detra-
giache et al. [2000], Elsas [2005], and Ongena and Smith [2000].
3 Hubert and Scha¨fer [2002] and Morris and Shin [2004] were the first to apply the global
game concept in the context of coordination failure among multiple creditors.
3only by providing additional capital, but also by deciding whether to extend or to
withdraw its credit and signaling this decision to the arm’s length banks.
Our model suggests that it essentially depends on this strategic interaction between
the banks if a debtor firm receives forbearance lending and faces a soft budget
constraint. We apply a global game as analyzed by Schu¨le and Stadler [2005]
to demonstrate that the relationship bank’s size and its informational advantage
over the arm’s length banks largely affect its signaling ability, which in turn exerts
influence on the refinancing decision of the relationship bank and on the debtor firm’s
incentives to thwart default. Confining our attention to the limiting cases where the
relationship bank is arbitrarily better or worse informed than the arm’s length banks,
we show that the relationship bank’s willingness to engage in forbearance lending is
increasing in its volume of credit and in its informational advantage. These results
are affirmed by strong empirical evidence from Peek and Rosengren [2005].
Analyzing Japanese firm-level panel data, they find that banks are more likely to
increase loans to financially distressed firms the greater these banks’ proportion of
total firm debt is and the closer their affiliations with the debtor firms are. Regarding
the debtor firm’s incentives to avoid bancruptcy, our model suggests that the effects
of anticipated additional bank financing can be both positive or negative, depending
on the fundamental state of the firm and the signaling ability of the relationship
bank. Under certain conditions, the expectation of refinancing encourages the firm
to incur more effort to work against default. However, in a situation where the debtor
firm would avoid bancruptcy without assistance, the relationship bank’s inability to
commit credibly not to grant additional capital diminishes the effort of the firm,
inducing debtor moral hazard a` la Berglo¨f and Roland [1997, 1998].
Irrespective of the signaling effect, incorporating the relationship bank’s option to
withdraw its credit enables us to confirm a result of Berglo¨f and Roland [1997].
An increase in the firm’s collateral lowers the relationship bank’s incentives to engage
in forbearance lending and hardens the budget constraint of the debtor firm in the
sense that it reduces the severity of debtor moral hazard.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model
and describe the timing of events. Section 3 solves the coordination game among
the banks. We analyze under which conditions the relationship bank is disposed to
engage in forbearance lending and when the debtor firm exerts an effort to avoid
bankruptcy. Section 4 examines the effects of refinancing on the behavior of the
firm. Section 5 concludes.
42 The Model
The model considers a simple economy with three types of risk neutral agents: a
firm, a relationship bank, and a continuum of arm’s length banks. The firm decides
to set up a risky investment project financed by the banks. A proportion λ ∈ (0, 1)
of the required credit is provided by the relationship bank. Loans financed by the
continuum of arm’s length banks are negligibly small individually but amount to a
combined mass of 1− λ. Success or failure of the project are uncertain at the time
of investment. If the project fails, the firm is forced into bancruptcy and is not able
to refund the loans. If the project succeeds, the debtor firm remains in operation
and banks receive the full face value of a loan, normalized to 1. At an interim stage
before the project matures, both the relationship bank and the arm’s length banks
have the option to withdraw their credit and seize the collateral κ ∈ (0, 1). In order
to meet the claims of foreclosing banks, the debtor firm can draw on available cash
of θ ≡ ψ + e. The variable ψ ∈ R denotes the underlying fundamental state of the
investment project and can be interpreted as a measure of project quality, while
e ≥ 0 represents a costly restructuring effort undertaken by the firm to enhance its
liquidity.
By assumption, the debtor firm can avoid the project’s failure on its own and is
able to repay the loans at maturity whenever θ ≥ `, where ` ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
proportion of loans that are foreclosed at the interim stage. Hence, success of the
project is certain in case of high liquidity θ ≥ 1, and we say that the firm is insolvent
if the project is doomed to failure without foreign support, i.e. if θ < 0. In the
intermediate range 0 ≤ θ < 1, the debtor firm is solvent but illiquid and its fate
lies entirely in the hands of the banks. While the arm’s length banks can affect
the project’s success merely by their decision whether to roll over their loans or to
foreclose, the relationship bank has an accessory influence capability. It is able to
provide additional liquidity m ≥ 0 to the firm in order to reduce the probability
of default. With this refinancing from the relationship bank, the project succeeds
whenever
θ +m ≥ ` .
It is assumed that the additional credit m cannot be refunded by the firm, so that
the relationship bank’s costs of refinancing amount to m.
We can now describe our setup more formally by supplying the sequence of moves
in the game, the information available at all stages, and the payoffs of all interested
parties.
5Period 0:
• The firm invests the bank loans in the project.
• Nature chooses the fundamental state ψ of the project. ψ becomes the firm’s
private information.
• The firm chooses the restructuring effort e, taking into account the value of
ψ and the costs c(e) associated with restructuring. Let c(e) be any strictly
increasing function with c(0) = 0.
• From the banks’ perspective, θ = ψ+ e is a random variable with an improper
uniform prior over the real line, i.e. banks do not possess any public information
on the firm’s liquidity.4 However, they receive private signals regarding the
available cash of the firm. The relationship bank observes the realization of
the noisy signal
y = θ + τη , (1)
where τ > 0 is a scale factor indicating the amount of noise and η is a random
variable drawn from the standard normal distribution. Likewise, an arm’s
length bank i receives the private signal
xi = θ + σεi (2)
with the scale factor σ > 0 and εi ∼ i.i.d. N(0, 1).
Period 1:
• Considering the private signal y, the relationship bank makes its roll over or
foreclosure decision. If it decides not to foreclose on its loans, the bank chooses
an amount of refinancing m ≥ 0 so as to maximize its payoff
u(θ,m, `) =
1−m if θ +m ≥ `−m if θ +m < `
from rolling over a loan. The amount of refinancing m is announced publicly
and hence is common knowledge among all.
4 As Morris and Shin [2003] point out, improper uniform priors are well behaved, as far as we
are concerned only with conditional beliefs, and can be interpreted as the limiting case where
the information in the prior density becomes diffuse.
6• The arm’s length banks are able to observe the relationship bank’s behavior
and make their own roll over decisions based on this observation and on their
private signals xi. Their payoff from extending the credit is given by
v(θ,m, `) =
1 if θ +m ≥ `0 if θ +m < ` .
Period 2:
• The project matures. Payoffs of the firm and of banks that have rolled over
their loans are realized.
• Clearly, the payoff of the debtor firm has to be an increasing function of its
liquidity θ. For the sake of simplicity, we assume without further loss of gen-
erality that the firm’s payoff is identical to the payoff of an arm’s length bank
except for the costs of restructuring c(e):
v(θ,m, `)− c(e) =
1− c(e) if θ +m ≥ `−c(e) if θ +m < ` .
3 The Equilibrium
In this section we solve the model by backwards induction, analyzing successively
the banks’ roll over strategies, the refinancing decision of the relationship bank, and
the restructuring effort undertaken by the firm. This enables us to determine how
signaling by the relationship bank affects its willingness to engages in forbearance
lending and under which conditions this behavior gives rise to soft budget constraints
for the debtor firm.
3.1 Roll Over Decision of the Banks
In order to solve the subgame where the banks make their roll over or foreclosure
decisions conditional on the debtor firm’s liquidity and the amount of refinancing
granted by the relationship bank, we adopt a global game as analyzed by Schu¨le
and Stadler [2005]. Within the class of switching-strategies this sequential-move
game has a unique equilibrium, characterizing the behavior of the banks by the
5-tuple (yˆ, x, x, θ, θ). In equilibrium, the relationship bank decides to foreclose on
7its loans if and only if the private signal y is below the threshold signal yˆ. Arm’s
length banks observe the decision of the relationship bank and use this additional
information to update their beliefs regarding the firm’s liquidity. Thus, an arm’s
length bank i withdraws its credit only for private signals xi < x if it has observed
the relationship bank rolling over and refinancing, but it will even stop lending for
signals below the upper threshold x if the relationship bank has foreclosed before.
Since the private signals of the banks are correlated with the firm’s liquidity θ, there
exist threshold values θ and θ corresponding to the respective critical signals x and
x, so that the success of the project entirely depends on the relationship bank’s
behavior whenever θ ≤ θ < θ.
To derive these equilibrium thresholds, first consider the decision of the relationship
bank. As its expected payoff from rolling over and refinancing is given by
Pr(θ ≥ θ|y)−m = Φ
(
y − θ
τ
)
−m ,
the critical signal yˆ has to solve the indifference condition
Φ
(
yˆ − θ
τ
)
−m = κ ,
so that
yˆ = θ + τΦ−1(κ+m) . (3)
If the relationship bank forecloses on its loans, the project succeeds if and only if
θ ≥ θ. Thus, the relevant threshold signal x for the arm’s length banks is implicitly
defined by the cutoff condition
Pr(θ ≥ θ | y < yˆ, xi = x) = κ . (4)
In this case, the proportion of loans foreclosed at the interim stage amounts to
` = λ + (1 − λ)Pr(xi < x|θ). Since the relationship bank stops lending, it has no
incentive to refinance and thus the liquidity threshold θ for a successful completion
of the project solves the critical mass condition
θ = λ+ (1− λ)Pr(xi < x|θ = θ) . (5)
If the relationship bank decides to roll over and refinance instead, due to a private
signal y ≥ yˆ, the threshold signal x where the arm’s length banks are indifferent
between premature foreclosure and continued lending is given by
Pr(θ ≥ θ|y ≥ yˆ, xi = x) = κ (6)
8and the corresponding critical mass condition is
θ +m = (1− λ)Pr(xi < x|θ = θ) . (7)
To obtain the threshold values characterizing the equilibrium of this subgame, the
equations (3) to (7) have to be solved simultaneously. While explicit solutions are
not procurable for general parameter values, we are able to derive the equilibrium
thresholds in the two limiting cases where the relationship bank is arbitrarily better
and worse informed, respectively, than the arm’s length banks.
Proposition 1 The firm’s liquidity thresholds contingent on the rela-
tionship bank’s roll over or foreclosure decision and the amount of refi-
nancing m converge to
θ = −m (8)
θ = 1 (9)
in case of an arbitrarily better informed relationship bank (σ/τ → ∞),
and they tend to
θ = κ(1− λ)−m (10)
θ = κ(1− λ) + λ (11)
if the relationship bank is arbitrarily worse informed (σ/τ → 0).
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition implies that there are two ways for the relationship bank to exert
influence on the success of the firm’s investment project. Directly, granting addi-
tional bank financing might bail out a debtor firm in financial distress by lowering
the relevant threshold θ. In addition to this direct influence capability analyzed by
Takeda and Takeda [2005], our model suggests that the relationship bank can
affect the fate of the debtor firm also indirectly by signaling its roll over or fore-
closure decision. As the liquidity thresholds in Propostion 1 indicate, this ability
to coordinate the behavior of arm’s length banks is considerably influenced by the
relationship bank’s size λ and by its informational advantage σ/τ .
As σ/τ →∞, the thresholds θ and θ converge to their lower and upper bounds, re-
spectively, indicating that an infinitely better informed relationship bank indirectly
exerts the maximum influence on the arm’s length banks’ roll over strategy. They
follow the credit decision of the relationship bank blindly, irrespective of their own
9private signals regarding θ and regardless of the relationship bank’s size λ. Antic-
ipating this pure herding behavior among the arm’s length banks, the relationship
bank acts as if it was the only lender. But even an informationally disadvantaged
relationship bank in the opposite extreme case when σ/τ → 0 has an impact on the
arm’s length banks’ roll over or foreclosure decision. However, since the relation-
ship bank does not possess any informational signaling ability in this case, it can
affect the equilibrium outcome of the game indirectly only in as much as its size λ
is relevant. As λ → 1, the relationship bank is essentially the only lender and the
liquidity thresholds of the debtor firm correspond to those in case when σ/τ → 0.
In contrast, as λ→ 0, the firm’s liquidity thresholds θ and θ coincide except for the
amount of refinancing m, implying that an arbitrarily worse informed relationship
bank can influence the success of the project merely directly by providing additional
bank financing. This special case of our analysis corresponds to the benchmark
model of Takeda and Takeda [2005] which abstracts from signaling.
3.2 Refinancing by the Relationship Bank and Implications
on Forbearance Lending
As we have derived the liquidity thresholds for the project’s success contingent on
the relationship bank’s roll over or foreclosure decision and the amount of additional
bank financing m, we are now in a position to analyze the refinancing strategy of the
relationship bank. Taking into consideration the two limiting cases of an arbitrarily
better and worse informed relationship bank allows us to determine under which
conditions refinancing of financially distressed debtor firms actually degenerates into
forbearance lending.
First, consider the case where the relationship bank obtains much more precise
private information regarding the debtor firm’s liquidity than the arm’s length banks
(σ/τ →∞). Taking into account its private signal y, the relationship bank chooses
an amount of additional bank financing m ≥ 0 to maximize the expected payoff
Pr(θ ≥ θ|y)−m = Φ
(
y +m
τ
)
−m (12)
whenever rolling over and refinancing is profitable. To ensure that a solution for the
above optimization problem exists, assume that the relationship bank’s signal y is
sufficiently precise, τ ∈ (0, 1√
2pi
]. Then, maximization of the expected payoff (12)
with respect to m yields
m(y) = −y +R , (13)
10
where R ≡ τφ−1(τ) > 0.5 Since m ≥ 0 by definition, equation (13) implies that
the relationship bank has no incentive to grant additional credit for sufficiently high
private signals y ≥ R. However, it also abstains from refinancing if foreclosing on
the loans is a dominant strategy, i.e. if the expected payoff from rolling over and
choosing the optimal amount of refinancing is lower than the debtor firm’s collateral,
Φ
(
y +m(y)
τ
)
−m(y) < κ .
Rearranging this condition implies that the relationship bank stops lending and does
not engage in additional financing of the debtor firm if
y < R− S ,
where S ≡ Φ(R/τ) − κ. Hence, in the limiting case when σ/τ → ∞, the optimal
amount of refinancing m as a function of the relationship bank’s private signal y can
be expressed as
m∗(y) =

0 if y < R− S
−y +R if R− S ≤ y < R
0 if y ≥ R .
(14)
In case of good expectations regarding the firm’s liquidity, y ≥ R, the relationship
bank extends its loans but does not provide additional capital since the costs of
refinancing exceed its benefits in terms of a higher probability of success. In contrast,
low private signals y < R− S imply that the expected payoff from rolling over and
refinancing is lower than the collateral κ. In this case it is a dominant strategy for
the relationship bank to stop lending and abstain from refinancing. However, the
relationship bank has an incentive to roll over its loans and grant additional credit
m > 0 for private signals R− S ≤ y < R whenever S > 0. That is, the relationship
bank engages in refinancing for intermediate values of y if and only if the debtor
firm’s collateral κ is sufficiently low, κ < Φ(φ−1(τ)). Beyond this, we can infer from
∂S/∂κ < 0 that the relationship bank is more likely to provide additional capital
the lower the collateral it could seize in case of premature foreclosure.
By our definition, refinancing degenerates into forbearance lending if the relationship
bank is disposed to bail out economically insolvent debtor firms with θ < 0. To derive
more clear-cut results regarding the incidence of forbearance lending, consider the
case where the private signal of the relationship bank becomes arbitrarily precise.
5 Proof. See the Appendix.
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As τ → 0, we obtain y → θ, R→ 0, and S → 1−κ, so that the refinancing strategy
(14) transforms to
m∗(θ) =

0 if θ < κ− 1
−θ if κ− 1 ≤ θ < 0
0 if θ ≥ 0 .
(15)
This result makes intuitive sense. In the case when σ/τ → ∞, an infinitely precise
informed relationship bank is willing to bail out the debtor firm if it is insolvent, but
not hopelessly so. If κ−1 ≤ θ < 0, it is a rational choice for the relationship bank to
engage in forbearance lending, since the costs of refinancing are overcompensated by
the increase of the expected payoff from rolling over. However, there is no need to
refinance the investment project of a solvent firm, since the informational signaling
ability of the relationship bank completely averts coordination failure among the
arm’s length banks. Thus, additional bank financing necessarily degenerates into
forbearance lending if the relationship bank is much better informed than the arm’s
length banks.
To analyze the effects of signaling by the relationship bank on the incidence of
forbearance lending, compare these results with the opposite extreme case where
σ/τ → 0. The informationally disadvantaged relationship bank chooses the amount
of refinancing m ≥ 0 that maximizes
Pr(θ ≥ θ|y)−m = Φ
(
y − κ(1− λ) +m
τ
)
−m
whenever rolling over and refinancing yields an expected payoff not lower than κ.
By similar reasoning as above, the incidence of additional bank financing contingent
on the relationship bank’s private signal y can be derived as
m∗(y) =

0 if y < κ(1− λ) +R− S
κ(1− λ)− y +R if κ(1− λ) +R− S ≤ y < κ(1− λ) +R
0 if y ≥ κ(1− λ) +R .
(16)
This solution indicates that an infinitely worse informed relationship bank also en-
gages in refinancing for intermediate values of the private signal y if S > 0. Thus,
irrespective of the relationship bank’s signaling ability, additional credit is granted
to a firm in financial distress only if its collateral κ is sufficiently small. A com-
parison of (14) and (16) shows to what extent signaling by the relationship bank
exerts influence on the conditions for additional bank financing. Since a relatively
uninformed relationship bank can affect the credit decision of the arm’s length banks
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only in as much as its size λ is relevant, the interval of private signals y where refi-
nancing takes place is shifted to the right by κ(1−λ). As λ→ 0, the signaling effect
of the arbitrarily worse informed relationship bank vanishes, so that our refinancing
strategy (16) coincides with the result of Takeda/Takeda (2005) who disregard the
strategic interaction between banks in their model.
As the relative precision of information σ/τ and the volume of credit λ influence
the conditions under which a relationship bank engages in refinancing, these factors
also have an impact on the incidence of forbearance lending. In the limit as τ → 0,6
additional financing by an arbitrarily worse informed relationship bank is given by
m∗(θ) =

0 if θ < κ(2− λ)− 1
κ(1− λ)− θ if κ(2− λ)− 1 ≤ θ < κ(1− λ)
0 if θ ≥ κ(1− λ) .
(17)
Obviously, the limited signaling ability of an informationally disadvantaged relation-
ship bank compared to the case when σ/τ → ∞ diminishes its incentives to bail
out an intrinsically insolvent debtor firm with θ < 0. Since the relationship bank
does not posses any informational signaling ability as σ/τ → 0, the signaling effect
is merely a result of its size λ. Thus, the relationship bank engages in forbearance
lending if and only if its credit as proportion of total firm debt is sufficiently large,
λ > 2− 1
κ
. Otherwise forbearance lending is not profitable for the relationship bank
since its limited capability to coordinate the credit decisions of arm’s length banks
causes too severe coordination failure.
Although we had to restrict our analysis of the refinancing decision to the limiting
cases where the relationship bank is arbitrarily better or worse informed relative to
the arm’s length banks, our findings indicate that the relationship bank’s signaling
ability exerts considerable influence on the incidence of forbearance lending. Com-
paring our results with the benchmark model of Takeda and Takeda [2005],
we find that the relationship bank’s ability to signal its roll over decision reduces
the costs of forbearance lending as it dilutes coordination failure among the arm’s
length banks. Hence, an intrinsically insolvent debtor firm can rather expect to be
rescued from bancruptcy if the credit granted by the relationship bank is large as a
proportion of total firm debt and if the relationship bank is relatively well informed
compared to the arm’s length banks. In the extreme cases where the relationship
bank can completely avert coordination failure either by its informational signaling
6 As τ → 0 in the case of an arbitrarily worse informed relationship bank, σ has to converge to 0
with an infinitely faster rate to ensure that σ/τ → 0 holds.
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ability (σ/τ → ∞) or by its size (λ → 1), granting additional bank financing to a
debtor firm necessarily degenerates into forbearance lending.
3.3 The Restructuring Effort of the Firm
To determine the restructuring effort undertaken by the debtor firm in equilibrium,
we confine our attention to the limiting case of an infinitely precise informed rela-
tionship bank. Taking the limit as τ → 0 facilitates our analysis to the effect that
the investment project succeeds if and only if the relationship bank rolls over its
loans and grants the optimal amount of refinancing.7 Anticipating the subsequent
behavior of the banks, the debtor firm chooses the restructuring effort e so as to
maximize its payoff
u(e) =
1− c(e) if y ≥ yˆ−c(e) if y < yˆ .
Again, we consider the two limiting cases where the relationship bank obtains arbi-
trarily more and less precise signals than the arm’s length banks in order to analyze
to what extent the signaling effect has an impact on the restructuring effort of the
firm.
First, suppose that the relationship bank is very accurately informed compared to
the arm’s length banks (σ/τ → ∞). As τ → 0, we obtain y → θ = ψ + e and
yˆ → κ− 1, so that the optimization problem of the debtor firm can be expressed as
max
e≥0
u(e) =
1− c(e) if ψ + e ≥ κ− 1−c(e) if ψ + e < κ− 1 . (18)
Considering without further loss of generality the case of the linear cost function
c(e) = e, the firm’s optimal effort level as a function of the fundamentals ψ can be
explicitly derived as
e∗(ψ) =

0 if ψ < κ− 2
κ− 1− ψ if κ− 2 ≤ ψ < κ− 1
0 if ψ ≥ κ− 1 .
(19)
7 Deviating from the limit as τ → 0 would merely complicate the analysis without changing our
results qualitatively. We would have to consider four cases: 1. the relationship bank rolls over and
the project succeeds, 2. the relationship bank rolls over and the project fails, 3. the relationship
bank stops lending and the project succeeds, 4. the relationship bank stops lending and the
project fails.
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The debtor firm embarks on a costly restructuring effort only for intermediate values
of project qualities, and the effort level diminishes linearly in ψ. If the underlying
fundamental state of the project is sound, ψ ≥ κ − 1, the debtor firm anticipates
that refinancing and continued lending by the banks are sufficient for the project to
succeed even without restructuring. In contrast, if ψ < κ− 2, the project is doomed
to failure even with an effort, so that the debtor firm abstains from restructuring.
Analogously, we can determine the optimal restructuring effort of the debtor firm in
case of an arbitrarily worse informed relationship bank when σ/τ → 0. In the limit
as τ → 0, the firm has to choose e to solve
max
e≥0
u(e) =
1− c(e) if ψ + e ≥ κ(2− λ)− 1−c(e) if ψ + e < κ(2− λ)− 1 . (20)
For the linear cost function c(e) = e, the optimal effort level is given by
e∗(ψ) =

0 if ψ < κ(2− λ)− 2
κ(2− λ)− 1− ψ if κ(2− λ)− 2 ≤ ψ < κ(2− λ)− 1
0 if ψ ≥ κ(2− λ)− 1 .
(21)
Again, the firm has an incentive to invest in restructuring if and only if its project
is of intermediate quality, and the restructuring effort is linearly decreasing in ψ.
Comparing the solutions (19) and (21), we find that restructuring by the firm occurs
in both cases with the same probability ex ante, before nature chooses the project’s
fundamental state ψ. However, as the signaling ability of the relationship bank
affects coordination among the arm’s length banks, it also exerts influence on the
conditions under which the debtor firm embarks on a costly restructuring effort.
The firm has an incentive to work against default in case of lower quality projects if
the relationship bank’s size λ and its informational advantage σ/τ are large, i.e. if
signaling by the relationship bank diminishes coordination failure among the credit
decisions of the arm’s length banks.
4 Implications on Soft Budget Constraints
Having derived the equilibrium behavior of the relationship bank and the debtor firm
in the last section, we are now able to analyze in what circumstances anticipated
refinancing by the relationship bank actually leads to a soft budget constraint for
the firm. By our definition, a firm has a soft budget constraint if and only if it can
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expect to receive financial support from the relationship bank and if this expectation
diminishes the debtor firm’s incentives to embark on a costly restructuring effort. To
determine the incidence of such debtor moral hazard we have to compare the effort
level of a firm with anticipated additional bank financing to a world in which the
relationship bank can credibly commit not to refinance. Again, we are particularly
interested to what extent the signaling ability of the relationship bank in terms
of its size and the relative informational advantage impacts our results. Thus, we
consider both limiting cases of an arbitrarily better and worse informed relationship
bank when analyzing soft budget constraints of the debtor firm.
Suppose that the relationship bank is significantly better informed than the arm’s
length banks. If the firm is not able to anticipate refinancing, the lower liquidity
threshold θ for the project’s success converges to 0 as σ/τ →∞, and thus the debtor
firm’s optimization problem (18) transforms to
max
e≥0
u(e) =
1− c(e) if ψ + e ≥ 0−c(e) if ψ + e < 0 . (22)
The difference between (18) and (22) is that the minimum level of liquidity ψ + e
required to avoid the project’s default has to be larger without anticipated refinanc-
ing by the relationship bank. Again considering the case of the linear cost function
c(e) = e, the debtor firm’s effort decision contingent on the project quality ψ can be
derived as
eˆ∗(ψ) =

0 if ψ < −1
−ψ if − 1 ≤ ψ < 0
0 if ψ ≥ 0 .
(23)
A comparison of (19) and (23) indicates that the expectation of being refinanced by
an arbitrarily better informed relationship bank exerts influence on the debtor firm’s
restructuring effort whenever κ−2 ≤ ψ < 0. However, in our model the relationship
bank’s inability to commit credibly not to bail out a firm in financial distress does
not necessarily lead to soft budget constraints as in Dewatripont and Maskin
[1995] or Berglo¨f and Roland [1997, 1998]. In fact, if κ − 2 ≤ ψ < −1 the
debtor firm’s incentives to thwart default are higher compared to a situation in which
the firm cannot expect to receive additional credit. Anticipating the support of the
relationship bank, the debtor firm feels encouraged to incur a costly restructuring
effort that is just sufficient to avoid bancruptcy. Without anticipated refinancing
however, the costs of preventing the project’s failure would be prohibitive, so that
the firm would abstain from restructuring and default. In contrast, a debtor firm
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expecting additional financing from an arbitrarily better informed relationship bank
faces a soft budget constraint whenever −1 ≤ ψ < 0. In this case the project
quality ψ lies in the region where the debtor firm would avoid bankruptcy by its
own effort without assistance, but the anticipation of refinancing by the relationship
bank reduces the firm’s incentives to work against default.
To investigate the effects of the relationship bank’s signaling ability on the incidence
of soft budget constraints let us compare these results with the case of an infinitely
worse informed relationship bank. As σ/τ → 0, θ converges to κ(1 − λ) if the
relationship bank can commit credibly not to refinance the debtor firm, and thus,
as τ → 0, (20) transforms to
max
e≥0
u(e) =
1− c(e) if ψ + e ≥ κ(1− λ)−c(e) if ψ + e < κ(1− λ) . (24)
If the cost function is given by c(e) = e, the solution to this optimization problem
amounts to
eˆ∗(ψ) =

0 if ψ < κ(1− λ)− 1
κ(1− λ)− ψ if κ(1− λ)− 1 ≤ ψ < κ(1− λ)
0 if ψ ≥ κ(1− λ) .
(25)
Comparing the debtor firm’s effort decision (21) and (25) in case of an infinitely
worse informed relationship bank implies that the bank’s inability to commit cred-
ibly not to grant additional credit again exerts ambiguous influence on the firm’s
restructuring effort. For intermediate values of the project quality, κ(2 − λ) − 2 ≤
ψ < κ(1 − λ) − 1, anticipated refinancing by the relationship bank prompts the
debtor firm to embark on a costly restructuring effort, averting bancruptcy of the
firm. However, if κ(1−λ)−1 ≤ ψ < κ(1−λ) the firm faces a soft budget constraint,
as the relationship bank’s incapability to commit credibly not to pursue a policy of
forbearance diminishes the effort level of the debtor firm.
Table 1:
Effects of anticipated refinancing by the relationship bank
The relationship bank is relatively
Anticipated refinancing informed uninformed
leads to (σ/τ →∞, τ → 0) (σ/τ → 0, τ → 0)
Increased effort κ− 2 ≤ ψ < −1 κ(2− λ)− 2 ≤ ψ < κ(1− λ)− 1
Soft budget constraints −1 ≤ ψ < 0 κ(1− λ)− 1 ≤ ψ < κ(1− λ)
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Table 1 depicts to what extent the relationship bank’s signaling ability exerts influ-
ence on the debtor firm’s incentives to exert a costly restructuring effort. Note that
the length of the respective intervals in the table is equal and independent of the
relationship bank’s size λ. Thus, neither the relative precision of information σ/τ
nor the volume of credit λ impact the ex ante probability of soft budget constraints
and increased effort by the debtor firm, before nature chooses the project quality ψ.
However, the ability of the relationship bank to coordinate the roll over and fore-
closure decisions of the arm’s length banks essentially affects the conditions under
which a firm faces a soft budget constraint or is disposed to increase its effort. As
the table reveals, the regions in which anticipated refinancing influences the level of
the firm’s restructuring effort are shifted to the right by κ(1− λ) in the case when
σ/τ → 0. Hence, if the relationship bank can essentially diminish coordination fail-
ure among the arm’s length banks by signaling its roll over decision, soft budget
constraints rather appear in situations where we expect them to occur: when firms
conduct unprofitable projects and thus are intrinsically insolvent.
Our model implies that soft budget constraints arise due to a dynamic commitment
problem of the relationship bank. Thus, the relationship bank would have to improve
the credibility of its commitment not to engage in refinancing in order to harden a
firm’s budget constraint. Berglo¨f and Roland [1998] argue that the collateral of
the debtor firm can serve as a commitment device for a bank if it restores the bank’s
credibility not to pursue a policy of forbearance. In their model, a sufficiently high
value of collateral necessarily gives rise to a hard budget constraint, inducing the
firm to exert high effort. As our model incorporates the relationship bank’s option
to foreclose on its loans at an interim stage and seize the collateral κ, we are able to
confirm and enhance this finding of Berglo¨f and Roland [1998]. Irrespective
of the relationship bank’s signaling ability, our results on the effort decision of the
firm state that the ”softness” of the debtor firm’s budget constraint, i.e. the severity
of debtor moral hazard 4e = eˆ∗ − e∗, is decreasing in κ. An increase in the debtor
firm’s collateral κ leads to greater incentives for the relationship bank to refrain from
refinancing and to foreclose on its loans instead. Anticipating this behavior, a highly
collateralized firm incurs more restructuring effort to avoid bankruptcy, thus diluting
the severity of debtor moral hazard. In the limit as κ→ 1, it is a strictly dominant
strategy for the relationship bank to stop lending and abstain from refinancing, so
that the debtor firm faces a hard budget constraint as in Berglo¨f and Roland
[1998].
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has introduced a model of coordination failure among multiple heteroge-
neous creditors to account for the appearance of forbearance lending and soft budget
constraints in credit markets. Under certain conditions it might be a rational choice
for a bank to refinance an intrinsically insolvent debtor firm instead of writing off
its non-performing loans. This inability to commit credibly not to engage in for-
bearance lending often gives rise to a soft budget constraint, as it reduces the firm’s
incentives to thwart default.
Our model endogenously determined the equilibrium behavior of a relationship bank,
a continuum of arm’s length banks, and a debtor firm under incomplete private
information regarding the firm’s financial condition. Augmenting the game theoretic
framework of Morris and Shin [2005] and Takeda and Takeda [2005], we
modeled the relationship bank as a strategic player which can affect the fate of the
debtor firm by foreclosing or extending its credit, refinancing the firm, and signaling
its decisions to the arm’s length banks. We adopted the global game framework
from Schu¨le and Stadler [2005] to analyze how signaling by the relationship
bank impacts the severity of coordination failure among the arm’s length banks.
This enabled us to examine to what extent the relationship bank’s attributes exert
influence on the incidence of forbearance lending and soft budget constraints. We
found that a relationship bank is more likely to engage in forbearance lending the
greater its credit as a proportion of total firm debt is and the more precise its
private information compared to the arm’s length banks’ information is. Analyzing
the credit market in Japan, Peek and Rosengren [2005] find strong empirical
evidence for our results. They show that financially distressed firms predominantly
receive refinancing from their main banks, which typically are in close relation to
their debtor, and that additional bank financing is more likely to occur the greater
these banks’ proportion of total firm debt is. Regarding the effects of refinancing
by the relationship bank on the firm’s incentives to exert a costly restructuring
effort, we were able to specify the findings of Takeda and Takeda [2005]. In our
model it does not only depend on the fundamental state of a debtor firm whether
anticipated additional bank financing increases the firm’s effort to avoid bankruptcy
or induces a soft budget constraint, but also on the relationship bank’s signaling
ability. Irrespective of this signaling effect, our results state that the debtor firm’s
value of collateral crucially impacts the decisions of the relationship bank and the
firm. Confirming the findings of Berglo¨f and Roland [1998], we found that
a higher collateral value diminishes the relationship bank’s willingness to engage
in forbearance lending and hardens the firm’s budget constraint as it dilutes the
severity of debtor moral hazard.
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Summarizing our results, we believe that the signaling ability of a large and powerful
lender can exert considerable influence on the occurrence of soft budget constraints
and forbearance lending. In reference to the empirical prevalence of relationship
lending, this signaling effect should thus be regarded when analyzing incentive prob-
lems in credit markets with asymmetric information.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From (1) and (2), the private signal of the relationship bank can be rewritten as
y = xi + τη − σεi . (A1)
Using the equations (3) and (A1), an arm’s length bank’s posterior probability
assessment of the project’s success, conditional on the signal xi and observing the
relationship bank continuing lending, can be expressed as
Pr (θ ≥ θ | y ≥ yˆ, xi) = Pr (xi − σεi ≥ θ | xi + τη − σεi ≥ θ + τΦ−1(κ+m))
= Pr
(
εi ≤ xi − θ
σ
∣∣∣∣ τη − σεi ≥ θ − xi + τΦ−1(κ+m)) ,
so that the cutoff condition (6) transforms to
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , τη − σεi ≥ θ − x+ τΦ−1(κ+m)
)
Pr (τη − σεi ≥ θ − x+ τΦ−1(κ+m)) = κ . (A2)
By similar reasoning, the indifference condition (4) in case of premature foreclosure
by the relationship bank can be rewritten as
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , τη − σεi < θ − x+ τΦ−1(κ+m)
)
Pr (τη − σεi < θ − x+ τΦ−1(κ+m)) = κ . (A3)
Explicit solutions for the equations (A2) and (A3) cannot be derived for general
parameter values, but for the limiting cases of an arbitrarily better (σ/τ → ∞) or
worse (σ/τ → 0) informed relationship bank.
First, consider the case when σ/τ →∞. Rewrite equation (A2) as
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , τση − εi ≥ θ−xσ + τσΦ−1(κ+m)
)
Pr
(
τ
σ
η − εi ≥ θ−xσ + τσΦ−1(κ+m)
) = κ
and take the limit as σ/τ →∞:
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ ,−εi ≤ θ−xσ
)
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ
) = 1 > κ . (A4)
It follows from (A4) that the critical signal of an arm’s length bank which has
observed the relationship bank rolling over its loans, tends to
x→ −∞ . (A5)
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Hence, the probability in equation (7) is equal to 0, implying that (8) holds. By the
same token, equation (A3) can be transformed to
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , τση − εi < θ−xσ + τσΦ−1(κ+m)
)
Pr
(
τ
σ
η − εi < θ−xσ + τσΦ−1(κ+m)
) = κ ,
and reduces to
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , εi > x−θσ
)
Pr
(
εi >
x−θ
σ
) = 0 < κ (A6)
in the limit as σ/τ → ∞. It follows from (A6) that the critical signal of an arm’s
length bank, having observed the relationship bank foreclosing on its loans, tends to
x→∞ . (A7)
Hence, the probability in equation (5) is equal to 1, implying that (9) holds.
Consider the opposite extreme case with σ/τ → 0. Equation (A2) can be rewritten
as
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , η − στ εi ≥ θ−xτ + Φ−1(κ+m)
)
Pr
(
η − σ
τ
εi ≥ θ−xτ + Φ−1(κ+m)
) = κ .
Taking the limit as σ/τ → 0 yields
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , η ≥ θ−xτ + Φ−1(κ+m)
)
Pr
(
η ≥ θ−x
τ
+ Φ−1(κ+m)
) = κ
and reduces to
Pr
(
εi ≤ x− θ
σ
)
= Φ
(
x− θ
σ
)
= κ (A8)
since the error terms εi and η are independent. Rearranging (A8) provides an arm’s
length bank’s critical signal if it observes the relationship bank rolling over:
x = θ + σΦ−1(κ) . (A9)
Substituting (A9) into equation (7) implies that (10) must hold:
θ = (1− λ)Pr(θ + σεi < θ + σΦ−1(κ))−m
= (1− λ) Φ (Φ−1(κ))−m
= κ(1− λ)−m .
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Equation (A3) can be rewritten as
Pr
(
εi ≤ x−θσ , η − στ εi < θ−xτ + Φ−1(κ+m)
)
Pr
(
η − σ
τ
εi <
θ−x
τ
+ Φ−1(κ+m)
) = κ ,
reducing to
Pr
(
εi ≤ x− θ
σ
)
= Φ
(
x− θ
σ
)
= κ (A10)
in the limiting case with σ/τ → 0. Solving (A10) for x,
x = θ + σΦ−1(κ) , (A11)
and substituting this threshold signal of an arm’s length bank in case of premature
foreclosure by the relationship bank into (5) yields equation (11):
θ = λ+ (1− λ)Pr(θ + σεi < θ + σΦ−1(κ))
= λ+ (1− λ) Φ (Φ−1(κ))
= κ(1− λ) + λ . Q.E.D.
A.2 Derivation of the amount of refinancing m(y) as σ/τ →∞
Maximization of (12) with respect to m yields the first order condition
1
τ
φ
(
y +m
τ
)
− 1 != 0 . (A12)
As follows from the properties of the standard normal density, a solution to (A12)
exists if and only if τ ≤ 1√
2pi
. Taking this into account when solving the first order
condition for m, we obtain equation (13):
m(y) = −y + τφ−1(τ) .
Using the extensive form of the standard normal density, φ(z) = 1√
2pi
e−z
2/2, the
second order condition of the relationship bank’s maximization problem can be ex-
pressed as
− 2
τ
√
2pi
e−
(y+m)2
2τ2
y +m
2τ 2
< 0 . (A13)
Obviously, (A13) holds if and only if y+m > 0, i.e. the relationship bank’s optimal
amount of refinancing m has to be larger than −y. Thus, it follows from (13) that
τφ−1(τ) > 0
must hold. Q.E.D.
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